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The Law and Economics of Stop-and-Frisk 
David Abrams* 
The relevant economic and legal research relating to police use of 
stop-and-frisk has largely been distinct.  There is much to be gained by 
taking an interdisciplinary approach.  This Essay emphasizes some of 
the challenges faced by those seeking to evaluate the efficacy and 
legality of stop-and-frisk, and suggests some ways forward and areas of 
exploration for future research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Police use of the stop-and-frisk tactic is a subject that has garnered 
much attention in the press recently.1  It has also been the focus of a 
 
* Professor of Law, Business Economics, and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School and the Wharton School.  Email: dabrams@law.upenn.edu.  The author would like to 
thank Ashleigh Taylor for excellent research assistance as well as John MacDonald and 
participants at Loyola University Chicago Law Journal’s “Sentence Structure: The Elements of 
Punishment” Symposium on April 4, 2014 for their questions and comments.  Special thanks to 
David Rudovsky, without whom I would not have been introduced to this important topic. 
1. See, e.g., Daniel Bergner, Is Stop-and-Frisk Worth It?, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 19, 2014, at 
54 (discussing the role and value stop-and-frisks have played in New York from the perspective 
of two police officers); Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013, at A1 (discussing a ruling by a federal judge in New York holding the 
stop-and-frisk tactics of the New York Police Department to be a violation of constitutional rights 
of minorities); Patrick Walters, ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging ‘Stop and Frisk’ Searches in 
Philadelphia, IND. GAZETTE, Nov. 5, 2010, at 5 (discussing the litigation in which eight 
individuals argue they were stopped without reason by Philadelphia police due to stop-and-frisk 
tactics); Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on 
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substantial amount of research by both legal academics and 
economists.2  However, the conversation surrounding stop-and-frisk has 
become fragmented: economic theorists consult largely with other 
economists, advocates tend to discuss their cases with other advocates, 
and often there is little communication across jurisdictions. 
There is much to be learned from reaching across disciplines, 
geographic regions, and perspectives.  The splintered discussion has 
slowed progress on the subject of stop-and-frisk, about which much 
remains to be done.  The goal of this Essay is to set forth a plan for 
reinvigorating work on assessing the use of stop-and-frisk. 
I begin by briefly summarizing the current lay of the land regarding 
stop-and-frisk and then describe the legal issues and origins of the stop-
and-frisk tactic.  Following this, I discuss the relevant economic 
literature and explain its contributions.  I then describe how stop-and-
frisk programs are currently evaluated and set forth proposals for how 
they should be evaluated.  In particular, this Essay’s analysis addresses 
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment issues involved in 
economic evaluations of stop-and-frisk, and how they differ.  While 
there are difficulties in setting benchmarks for evaluating the legality of 
the use of stop-and-frisk in real-world litigation—which may differ 
markedly from assumptions made in economic models—I discuss the 
balance I have tried to strike in my role as an expert in litigation in 
Philadelphia.  As an informative case study, I note the substantial 
differences between recent litigation in Philadelphia and New York 
City.  I conclude with some thoughts on the challenge of implementing 
real reform. 
 
Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, at A1 (detailing the announcement made by 
New York City’s mayor that the city would withdraw its appeal of the ruling that stop-and-frisk 
searches were unconstitutional if the court approves the settlement agreement). 
2. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s 
“Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS. 813 
(2007) (analyzing data for NYPD stops which indicated that they were stopping blacks and 
Hispanics more often than whites); David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and 
Frisk Debate Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 853 (2013) (discussing 
the need for more data on stop-and-frisk to broaden the debate over the impact of race on criminal 
justice); David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal, The Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk in New 
York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2013) (discussing the constitutionality of stop-and-
frisk searches and ultimately finding that both liability and remedial measures established in 
Floyd were necessary); Decio Coviello & Nicola Persico, An Economic Analysis of Black-White 
Disparities in NYPD’s Stop and Frisk Program (NBER Working Paper Series No. 18803, 2013), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18803 (analyzing data and attempting to determine the 
reason for the discrimination among stops). 
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I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Police officers often use stop-and-frisk, a tactic whereby officers may 
stop an individual whom they suspect to be involved in criminal 
activity, and frisk that individual given the officer’s belief that there is 
some likelihood that the individual has a weapon.3  This tactic goes 
back decades, but its use has increased substantially in the past ten to 
fifteen years and has become a major tactic used by police departments 
in large cities aimed at crime prevention.4  Police departments have 
asserted that stop-and-frisk programs are responsible for a large 
reduction in crime since the mid-1990s, although there is no reliable 
evidence for this claim.5 
The current legal framework for stop-and-frisk can be traced back to 
the 1968 Supreme Court case Terry v. Ohio.6  There, the Court 
articulated a reasonable suspicion standard (lower than the probable 
cause standard required for a full search) for stopping and potentially 
frisking an individual on the street or in a vehicle.7  The justification for 
the lower standard to permit a search was that the person being stopped 
and frisked was potentially armed and dangerous, and could harm 
officers, themselves, or bystanders.8 
Several cities across the United States have witnessed at least some 
stop-and-frisk litigation in the past decade.  Philadelphia and Los 
Angeles each had a round of litigation in the early 2000s.9  New York’s 
recent litigation has received a great deal of media coverage,10 while 
Philadelphia experienced its second round of stop-and-frisk litigation 
 
3. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1555 (9th ed. 2009) (defining stop-and-frisk as a “term 
used to describe what happens when a suspect is detained and then searched for any weapons”). 
4. See Harris, supra note 2, at 854 (discussing the increase in stop-and-frisks by the NYPD 
from 97,000 in 2002 to nearly 700,000 in 2011). 
5. Id. at 864. 
6. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
7. Id. at 27. 
8. Id. at 1. 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that defendants’ Hispanic appearances were not enough to cause reasonable suspicion to justify 
stopping them); Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153, 1163 (Pa. 2000) (holding that the 
seizure of drugs from Zhahir during a stop-and-frisk was permissible under the plain-feel 
doctrine). 
10. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 1 (discussing a federal judge’s holding that New York 
stop-and-frisk tactics violated minorities’ constitutional rights); Colleen Long, Trial Opens for 
NYC Stop-and-Frisk Challenge, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 19, 2013, available at http://bigstory. 
ap.org/article/ny-stop-and-frisk-challenge-heads-federal-court (discussing the New York trial, 
testimony and statistics with regards to stop-and-frisks); Weiser & Goldstein, supra note 1 
(discussing Mayor de Blasio’s decision to settle the dispute over stop-and-frisks, which was a 
divisive issue during his mayoral race, instead of continuing with the appeal). 
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beginning in 2010.11  The relevant New York case is Floyd v. City of 
New York,12 and the relevant Philadelphia case is Bailey v. 
Philadelphia.13  The Department of Justice is actively involved in 
ongoing stop-and-frisk litigation in a number of different locations, 
including cities in California.14  Although Chicago has not had any 
recent litigation, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has sent 
present Mayor Rahm Emanuel letters requesting the collection of data 
that would permit better evaluation of the Chicago Police Department’s 
practices.15 
At the heart of most stop-and-frisk litigation lie two constitutional 
issues: the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable search 
and seizure,16 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause,17 each of which I discuss in turn below.  Since the earliest stop-
and-frisk litigation, scholars and lawmakers have scrutinized and 
attempted to resolve problems with stop-and-frisk programs.  A 
shortcoming of some of these attempts is the absence of an 
interdisciplinary perspective.  One disciplinary perspective that can help 
inform many stop-and-frisk questions is the economic one. 
II.  ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
Economists are very good at thinking about the incentives of different 
actors in the criminal justice system, and how to detect disparities that 
may indicate discrimination.  This line of economic research originated 
 
11. The case, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, was ultimately settled in 2011.  Settlement 
Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. 
June 21, 2011) (No. 10-cv-05952). 
12. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
13. See Complaint, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, 2010 WL 4662865 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2010) 
(No. 2:10-cv-05925).  I have been involved with Bailey as a statistical expert on behalf of the 
plaintiffs, and Professor Jeffrey Fagan of Columbia University has been the statistical expert in 
the Floyd case. 
14. See, e.g., United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal at 
20, United States v. City of New Orleans, 2014 WL 3706621 (E.D. La. June 25, 2014) (No. 13-
30161) (asking the court to deny the motion to stay to trigger police reform); Statement of Interest 
by the United States at 3–4, Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (D. Ariz. 2013) 
(No. 07-cv-02513) (discussing the need to ensure that the unconstitutional practice is adequately 
remedied); Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department - Antelope Valley: Statement of Intent, 
July 27, 2013, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/antelope_statementofi 
ntent_6-28-13.pdf (detailing a statement of intent to reach a settlement agreement between the 
parties to resolve issues identified by the DOJ). 
15. Letter from ACLU to Rahm Emanuel, Steve Patton & Garry McCarthy (Jan. 15, 2013), 
available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Letter-to-Emanuel-Patton-McCa 
rthy-1-15-13.pdf. 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
ABRAMS PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  5:56 PM 
2014] The Law and Economics of Stop-and-Frisk 373 
in the 1960s with Nobel Laureate Gary Becker.18  The first well-known 
article applying the economic perspective on discrimination to police 
stops was published in 2001 in the Journal of Political Economy by 
John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd.19  Their article 
addresses a Fourteenth Amendment question regarding the detection of 
racial discrimination in motor vehicle searches, which is very similar to 
the stop-and-frisk context.20  They employ a simple model of stops that 
leads to a very stark conclusion about the detection of racial disparities 
in stops.21 
In the model, a race-blind officer simply seeks to stop individuals 
most likely to be in possession of contraband.  When a police officer 
seeks to detect contraband in a race-blind way, there may still be 
unequal stop rates by race,22 possibly due to a variation in crime rates 
by race.  However, a race-blind police officer should stop individuals 
such that the likelihood of discovering contraband is equal across 
races.23 
This perspective naturally leads to an evaluation approach called a 
“hit-rate” analysis.24  The “hit-rate” is simply the percentage of stops in 
which contraband is discovered.  The insight of the Knowles, Persico, 
and Todd paper is that one may evaluate the Fourteenth Amendment 
compliance of policing by simply calculating and comparing hit-rates 
by race.25  According to their theory, as long as hit rates are the same, 
there is no evidence of racial bias, even if stop rates differ by race. 
Since the 2001 paper, a number of economists who have written 
about hit-rate analysis have questioned some of the paper’s basic 
assumptions.26  These subsequent papers critique the Knowles, Persico, 
 
18. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (Univ. Chicago Press 1957). 
19. John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra E. Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: 
Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001). 
20. Id. at 203. 
21. Id. at 209. 
22. Id. at 205. 
23. Id. at 211. 
24. See, e.g., Nicola Persico & Petra E. Todd, The Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Motor-
Vehicle Searches, 25 JUST. Q. 37 (2008) (discussing how a previously developed rational choice 
model provides a test for detecting police bias in how they enforce the law). 
25. See id. at 42. 
26. Papers critical of the hit-rate approach include: Shamena Anwar & Hanming Fang, An 
Alternative Test of Racial Prejudice in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 96 AM. 
ECON. REV. 127 (2006); David Bjerk, Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect 
of a Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate, 9 J PUB. ECON. THEORY 521 (2007); William A. Brock 
et al., On the Observational Implications of Taste-Based Discrimination in Racial Profiling, 166 
J. ECONOMETRICS 66 (2012). 
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and Todd paper and point out its limitations.27  For example, if one 
assumes that police officers seek to achieve multiple objectives with a 
stop, then the result vanishes.28  If some of the paper’s assumptions 
change, then the analysis becomes much more complex.  In fact, it 
becomes so complicated that it is hard to know how one might perform 
an analysis evaluating Fourteenth Amendment compliance of a real-
world police department. 
This begs the question: if the theory is so complicated, then how does 
one evaluate a stop-and-frisk program when the law requires it?  How 
does an attorney determine if litigation is warranted?  Or, if litigation 
has already occurred, how does a statistical expert evaluate whether 
police are implementing reforms that have produced substantial change? 
Almost all of the current economic literature in the area focuses on 
Fourteenth Amendment issues.29  One general trend in this literature 
seems to be that the more realistic the models get, the less useful they 
are for actual evaluation.  The authors of these models are economic 
theorists attempting to devise and solve simplified models that capture 
the overall character of the problem.  They are not involved in litigation 
and therefore not bound by exigencies of responding to real-world facts 
and constraints.  In the absence of an interdisciplinary perspective, these 
models will continue have limited utility in real-world evaluations. 
III.  CURRENT APPROACHES TO FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
So how does one go about solving this problem?  On the one hand, 
one may use the simpler results of the earlier hit-rate paper30 and adopt 
their assumptions, which give a very clear method of analyzing actual 
data.  On the other hand, one may wish to use a more complicated 
model, acknowledging that the world is complex.  But in attempting to 
apply the more detailed models, one may lose the ability to make any 
evaluations at all, at least without substantial additional assumptions. 
Perhaps the most commonly used approach to evaluate stop-and-frisk 
 
27. See Anwar & Hanming, supra note 26, at 129 (discussing drawbacks to the Knowles, 
Persico, and Todd (“KPT”) model); Bjerk, supra note 26, at 526 (assuming that officers observe a 
signal of guilt from motorists, something KPT does not consider); Brock et al., supra note 26, at 
67 (noting the restrictions in KPT). 
28. For example, police may look for multiple types of contraband, or may look for suspects 
in multiple cases. 
29. See generally Rudovsky & Rosenthal, supra note 2 (discussing the Fourteenth 
Amendment violations of stop-and-frisk practices as found in courts); Josephine Unger, Frisky 
Business: Adapting New York City Policing Practices to Ameliorate Crime in Modern Day 
Chicago, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 659 (2014) (stating that police officers’ racial targeting for 
searches and seizures is a Fourteenth Amendment violation). 
30. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 19. 
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programs is regression analysis.  For example, in the Floyd litigation in 
New York, Professor Jeffrey Fagan used regressions to estimate the 
impact of race on stop rates, while attempting to control for other 
factors.31  However, this approach is difficult to implement and interpret 
because the researcher must determine which other factors to control 
for.  Should the researcher control for demographics of the area, 
economic status of the neighborhood where people are being stopped, 
other demographics of the area, or crime rates?  These may already be a 
function of what the police are doing, or the way the society is 
structured.  Does one control for police presence?  Again, that might 
already be a function of a police decision that was previously made.  In 
addition, there will always be control variables that the expert would 
like to include but that are not available. 
Indeed Fagan’s regression analysis finds racial disparity in New 
York, while a recent paper by Decio Coviello and Nicola Persico32—
one of the co-authors of the hit-rate paper—analyzed the New York data 
and found no racial disparity.33 
IV.  PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
Thus far, I have focused on the Fourteenth Amendment question, but 
now I turn to the Fourth Amendment issue, which in some ways is even 
more interesting.  There has been almost no work done by economists 
on the Fourth Amendment elements of these issues.  This is perhaps 
because the precise question is somewhat less clear and lends itself less 
easily to economic analysis. 
The Fourth Amendment issue ultimately comes down to a tradeoff 
between liberty and safety.  With stop-and-frisk, this means a balance 
between the liberty to walk down the street without being stopped and 
the safety that comes from not being victimized by crime or having fear 
of such victimization.  How might we think about this from an 
economic perspective, given that both of these considerations are very 
difficult to measure? 
First, one must try to analyze and quantify stop-and-frisk’s impact on 
safety.  The preliminary question that must be answered is whether 
stop-and-frisk actually reduces crime.  While a large number of police 
departments that use the tactic claim that it reduces crime, there is no 
rigorous study that supports this assertion. 
 
31. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 
2012) (No. 08-cv-01034). 
32. Coviello & Persico, supra note 2. 
33. Id. at 18. 
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So how might one go about determining the impact of stop-and-frisk 
tactics on crime?  One approach would be to use a difference-in-
difference design.  In general, the difference-in-difference approach 
allows for the evaluation of an intervention by comparing changes over 
time in two otherwise very similar groups: one of which receives the 
intervention and the other of which does not. 
For example, consider a hypothetical where two precincts in South 
Philadelphia have similar demographics, patterns of crime, police 
presence, and other characteristics.  Perhaps due to budgetary 
constraints one of the two precincts is chosen to implement a large 
increase in the use of stop-and-frisk and the other is not.  One measure 
of the impact of stop-and-frisk would be the difference in crime rates 
between the two precincts after the policy change (this is known as a 
single difference).  An even better measure may be obtained by 
subtracting off the crime rates in each precinct before the increase in 
stop-and-frisk.  By looking at the difference in the change in crime rates 
between the two precincts, one may control for pre-existing differences 
in crime rates and isolate just the impact of the stop-and-frisk change.  
Of course the difficulty of finding such examples in real life is what 
makes estimating the impact of stop-and-frisk on crime particularly 
challenging. 
But even once we estimate the impact of stop-and-frisk on crime, 
how can we measure the liberty aspect of stop-and-frisk?  This is an 
even greater empirical challenge, to which there is currently no good 
answer.  But progress can be made, even if we can only nail down the 
safety half of the question, because ultimately the tradeoff is a political 
one, made by aggregating how people individually trade off safety and 
liberty.  If we have good empirical estimates for the impact of stop-and-
frisk on crime, then we can ask people precise questions about the 
tradeoff. 
For example one could pose survey questions such as: 
 
A recent study determined that an increase from 200,000 to 300,000 
stops per year would eliminate thirteen robberies and twenty-two 




Halving the current rate of stops from 200,000 to 100,000 per year 
would result in an extra twenty robberies and thirty-two thefts per 
year.  Would you be in favor of this change?  
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 Responses may be dramatic.  There may be a vast number of people 
who believe that greater use of the stop-and-frisk tactic is necessary, or 
the reverse could be true.  But, at least if we quantify one part of the 
equation, we can ask people about the other, because ultimately, striking 
the right balance is a matter of aggregating individuals’ preferences 
(while of course taking account of potential distributional issues). 
 While the economic approach to the Fourth Amendment analysis 
described here is difficult, the legal approach currently in use is more 
straightforward (see below) and involves a determination of the legal 
sufficiency of the reason given for a stop. 
V.  RECENT EVALUATIONS IN PHILADELPHIA 
AND NEW YORK CITY 
The questions discussed here are ones with which economists, 
scholars, policymakers, and litigators struggle.  Having served as an 
expert in the Bailey litigation in Philadelphia, I have been forced to 
choose what I believe to be the best currently available tools to examine 
the facts at hand.  I describe my approach here as an example of how to 
use insight from economic theory to inform practical analysis of real-
world data. 
In my work, I make use of both regression and hit-rate analysis in 
studying Philadelphia stop-and-frisk data from 2010 to 2012.  I have 
found some evidence of racial disparities in this time period, but these 
disparities vary over time in their strength and significance.  In contrast, 
the Fourth Amendment analysis results are very consistent and stark. 
Concretely, the Fourth Amendment analysis incorporates two 
approaches.  Every time there is a stop in Philadelphia, a form must be 
filled out by the police officer performing the stop.34  In one approach 
for the Bailey analysis, attorneys David Rudovsky and Paul Messing 
examine a sample of the stops and their explanations and analyze them 
for legal sufficiency.35  This approach reveals that about 40–50% lack 
legal basis for the stop; a figure that has been fairly consistent over the 
last three years since Philadelphia entered into a consent decree.36 
The second approach is to examine the fraction of the time that police 
officers actually find a weapon, the suspected presence of which is the 
 
34. Robert Moran, Detailed Police Reports to be Required in All Stops: The Longer Forms 
are a Response to Concerns of Racial Profiling by Philadelphia Officers, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 
17, 1999, at A01. 
35. See Plaintiffs’ Fourth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices, Bailey v. 
City of Philadelphia (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2013) (No. 2:10-cv-05952). 
36. Id. at 4. 
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justification for performing a frisk.  In New York from 2003–2013, 
approximately 1-in-50 frisks resulted in a weapon.37  In Philadelphia in 
2012, approximately 1-in-600 stops resulted in a weapon.38  This then 
may feed back to the question to citizens: “Does this rate seem 
appropriate?”  If individuals are extremely fearful of firearms and place 
very little weight on liberty, then this rate may be appropriate, but 
ultimately this is a political question. 
It is interesting to contrast the legal strategies and the stop-and-frisk 
rates of the cities of Philadelphia and New York over the past few years.  
Philadelphia did not fight litigation in court, but instead chose to enter 
into a consent decree to monitor its stop-and-frisk program.39  Contrast 
this to New York, where the city actively fought litigation, went to 
court, received a lot of press, and was openly very resistant to change.40 
Philadelphia started out with a higher stop-and-frisk rate than New 
York, with 253,000 stops in 2009 out of a population of about 1.5 
million,41 versus 581,168 stops in New York for a population of about 
8.4 million in the same year.42  Philadelphia’s rate of stop-and-frisk has 
remained relatively the same since it entered into the consent decree, 
with 215,000 stops per year in 2012,43 while New York’s rate has 
dropped by more than half after the litigation began, to 191,558 stops in 
2013.44  More than three years have passed since the consent decree in 
Philadelphia was signed in 2011 and there remains the same high rate of 
improper stops, an incredibly low rate of finding weapons and an 
 
37. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Between 
January 2004 and June 2012, the NYPD conducted over 4.4 million Terry stops . . . .  [A] weapon 
was found after 1.5% of these frisks.”); N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, STOP AND FRISK DURING 
THE BLOOMBERG ADMINISTRATION (2002-2013), at 1 (2014) (“Of those frisked, a weapon was 
found only two percent of the time.”). 
38. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices, supra note 35, 
at 17. 
39. Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent Decree, Bailey v. City of 
Philadelphia, supra note 11. 
40. See Weiser & Goldstein, supra note 1, at A1. 
41. Holly Otterbein, Stop-and-Frisk Should be Stopped and Questioned, PHILLY.COM (Nov. 9, 
2010, 8:21 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/our-money/Stop-and-frisk_should_be_stopp 
ed_and_questioned.html. 
42. Id.  N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2012, at 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/2012_Report_NYCLU_0.pdf. 
43. Alex Wigglesworth, ACLU: Philly Police Stop-and-Frisk Problems Persist, METRO 
(March 19, 2013), http://www.metro.us/newyork/news/2013/03/19/aclu-philly-police-stop-and-
frisk-problems-persist/. 
44. New York peaked at over 685,724 stops in 2011.  N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 
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incredibly high stop rate overall.45  As evidenced by the data, things 
have not changed in Philadelphia.  This makes one wonder whether the 
cooperative approach might not be superior to the adversarial one for 
institutions seeking to maintain current practices. 
QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This leads to one final set of questions: even after getting past all of 
the challenges of measuring the legality of stop-and-frisk programs, if 
one does find problems, how does one bring about change?  How do 
police departments implement reform?  Bringing about change in large 
complicated organizations like a major city’s police force is well 
beyond the scope of this Essay, but is ultimately the final step in 
ensuring that police keep citizens safe while respecting the Constitution.  
 
45. See Plaintiffs’ Fourth Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices, supra note 
35 (noting that in the first quarter of 2013, there were 1126 pedestrian stops, 487 of which were 
made without reasonable suspicion, and 196 pedestrian frisks, 106 of which were made without 
reasonable suspicion). 
